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The estimation of minimum efficient scale of the port industry 
Abstract 
Terminal scale has been the subject of discrete episodes of hotly contested policy debates. From 
the perspective of port authorities or governments, knowing the Minimum Efficient Scale 
(MES) is salient, because they sometimes determine the port development or expansion based 
on the port capacity or the existing size of the terminal. Notwithstanding the importance of 
knowing the exact MES, extant literature has not managed to estimate MES in the port industry. 
This study aims to estimate the MES in the port industry in South Korea in order to identify 
whether Container Terminal Operators (CTOs) are under economies of scale, constant 
economies of scale or diseconomies of scale; we explore a bottom point of the average cost 
curve in order to suggest an adequate scale for the port industry in Korea. The finding 
demonstrates that undercapacity may be a strong issue in Korean container ports. However, 
CTOs in Busan port are in an overcapacity area given the market demand of container 
throughput in 2013, which is approximately 25 times larger than the estimated MES; in fact, 
all CTOs in Busan port operate at more than 20% of MES. This study then can provide port 
policy makers with a helpful tool to derive ex-ante MES level at the terminal designing stage 
and to adjust ex-post port investment decisions at the additional port capacity designing stage, 
which may contribute to avoiding overcapacity. 
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1. Introduction 
Rapid port development in North-East Asia which sought to dominate the market ahead of 
adjacent countries and achieve hub-port status has triggered severe competition between 
container ports. Although South Korea (hereafter Korea) has played a crucial role in the 
international shipping and port industry as an economy that handled the fourth largest global 
container port throughput of approximately 23 million TEU in 2013 and owned the fifth largest 
fleet in terms of dead weight tonnage with leading container shipping lines such as Hanjin 
shipping and Hyundai Merchant Marine and the second largest shipbuilding industry globally 
(UNCTAD, 2014), Container Terminal Operators (CTOs) particularly in Korea have suffered 
overcapacity problems which are unprecedented (Korea Shipping Gazette, 2014). This has 
devastated CTOs’ financial status, since a number of factors such as the increased bargaining 
power of shipping lines stemming from mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances amongst 
major shipping lines, withdrawal of sales from particular CTOs, and new entrants into existing 
ports have had a negative impact on container terminal markets overall. As a result, the terminal 
handling charge per TEU in ports was significantly less than in both China and Japan (Korea 
Shipping Gazette, 2013). This causes a loss of profits and an outflow of national wealth from 
Korea’s viewpoint.  
Terminal scale has been the subject of discrete episodes of hotly contested policy debates 
(Asteris and Collins, 2010). From the perspective of economic theories, CTOs should be keen 
on a scale that is equivalent to the minimum efficient scale (MES), which is defined as the 
long-run output where the internal economics of scale have been fully exploited (Kaselimi et 
al., 2011). CTOs are essentially interested in identifying the terminal scale in order to enter the 
market and compete with other CTOs, although the scale may vary according to locations with 
different costs (Kaselimi et al., 2011). From the perspective of port authorities or governments, 
knowing the MES is vital, because they sometimes determine the way in which existing assets 
should be subdivided for port concession. In addition, they may utilise this information 
regarding the MES, when they plan to develop new ports based on the port capacity or the 
existing size of the terminal. Central or regional governments or port authorities have strived 
for the optimal port capacity, because it is directly connected to both national and regional 
economics as an economic springboard (Tongzon and Heng, 2007; Bottasso et al., 2013; Deng 
et al., 2013; Song and van Geenhuizen, 2014; Chang et al., 2014; Park and Seo, 2016). 
Underestimation of port capacity results in constructing too many berths and equipment, 
whereas the overestimation leads to vessel congestion (Chang et al., 2012). For example, if the 
CTO pursues 100% berth utilisation, it can minimise its costs per ship for ship owners, but it 
generates costs due to waiting for berth (De Weille and Rai, 1974). Also, if the CTOs construct 
and operate many berths to minimise the vessels’ waiting time, they have to face high costs of 
constructing and operating the berths (De Weille and Rai, 1974). In fact, the relationship 
between the port capacity and waiting time is a trade-off.  In this regard, Jansson and Shneerson 
(1982) pointed out that the decisions on port investment should be in concert with the long-run 
total cost, incorporating port development costs and waiting costs of ships and cargo. 
Identifying the optimum port capacity is not easy, because it is required to reflect multiple 
perspectives of related players (e.g. ship owners and CTOs). This sometimes results in 
compromised port capacity rather than the optimum one. Accordingly, various stakeholders 
seek awareness of when the market becomes sufficiently large for the new terminal 
construction in the same ports via the estimation of the MES (Kaselimi et al., 2011).  
The estimation of MES for the service sector such as sea transport, aviation, travel, insurance, 
and land transport is rare owing to the difficulty of making such estimates, and MES for the 
service sector is likely to be lower than the manufacturing sector (Pratten, 1988). In the port 
context, some extant studies investigate the concept of ‘global optimum size’ of a terminal or 
a notion of critical mass of the container terminal (Musso et al., 1999; Wiegmans et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, Kaselimi et al. (2011) have attempted to identify the preferred scale of the 
container terminals, but they failed to find solutions due to different port governance, market 
size, structure and operational considerations. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the importance of 
knowing the exact MES (Theys et al., 2010; De Langen and Pallis, 2006), extant literature has 
not managed to estimate the MES in the port industry. A paucity of extant works on the MES 
in the port stimulated this study. Therefore, bearing in mind this research gap, the main purpose 
of this study is to estimate the MES in the port industry in Korea in order to identify whether 
CTOs are under economies of scale, constant economies of scale or diseconomies of scale so 
that we can explore a bottom point of the average cost curve. By doing so, this study can 
provide port planners and port policy makers with a helpful tool to derive ex-ante MES level 
at the terminal designing stage and to adjust ex-post port investment decisions at the additional 
port capacity designing stage, which may contribute to mitigating overcapacity. This study 
deals with the real issues in Korea, but the approach of this study might be applied to other 
regions of the world that suffer overcapacity issues (e.g. port of Colombo in Sri Lanka, see 
Galhena, 2015). 
Section 2 reviews the literature on overcapacity and the MES. Section 3 explains the main 
methodology this study employed. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, the research 
implication and conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
 2. Literature review 
2.1. The overcapacity issues and MES 
Traditionally, industrial organisations have been concerned with the optimum firm size and 
industrial plant capacity in order to minimise costs and maximise profits. Market structure is 
generally categorised into perfect competition, oligopoly, duopoly and monopoly. Such a 
structure is determined by the number of firms within the industry, the distribution of the firm 
size, product differentiation and entry condition. Amongst them, the number of firms may be a 
major determinant for the industry’s structural characteristics such as monopoly and perfect 
competition. Also, entry barrier, minimum capital for optimum scale and MES affect the 
market structure. In the area of industrial organisation the MES concept is of paramount 
importance, because large MES can significantly reduce unit cost and might cause high 
concentration and significant entry barriers (Caves et al., 1975; Cory, 1981). In this paper, the 
main focus lies in capacity issues as well as MES. 
Overcapacity occurs due to the misallocation of resources and a situation where superfluous 
infrastructure exists (Barzdukas et al., 2000). Haralambides (2002) pointed out that higher 
competition may bring a greater need for overcapacity of ports, and highlighted that the 
competition and overcapacity mix is an explosive cocktail. The advent of containerisation 
forces ports to remain capital-intensive and make tremendous investment in both port 
infrastructure and container handling equipment. Furthermore, the long life of terminals, 
capital indivisibilities, shipping liners’ interest in minimising ship waiting time, economies of 
scale in port construction and the optimism of port planners may be attributed to the risk of 
excess capacity of ports (Haralambides, 2002; Heaver, 1995).  
According to Porter (1998), expanding capacity is the most important strategic decision 
confronting firms in terms of the capital and the complexity of the decision-making problem 
since capacity adding requires lead times for years and capacity persists for a long time. 
Therefore, thorough expectations such as future demands and competitor’s future behaviour 
should be made before capacity expansion. There would be hostile consequences if a large 
number of competitors participate in expanding capacity. It is worth noting here that unlike a 
manufacturing sector which is able to produce for the future and manage capacity and demand 
by storing the products, transport service industries such as port, shipping, airline and rail are 
likely to face capacity issues due to the fact that the services they offer are not storable (De 
Weille and Rai, 1974). In most container ports in Korea, terminal markets seem to be oligopoly 
(Korea Shipping Gazette, 2013), in which CTOs are mutually inter-dependent. Each CTO 
strategic movement is centred on enhancing market share, while avoiding overcapacity. In 
general, ports decide to expand their facilities based on an expectation of a future cargo 
throughput, and internally-driven and customer-compelled strategies of each terminal may 
result in excessive duplication and overcapacity (Slack, 1993). Overcapacity would result in 
inefficient use of port infrastructure (Chang et al., 2012). In the port sector, there always exists 
a conflict between monopoly power and concern for excess capacity (Heaver, 1995). Monopoly 
tends to hinder innovation and efficiency while overcapacity results in inefficiencies due to 
superfluous duplication, which wastes high capital investment (Barzdukas et al., 2000).  
Knowing the MES would play a vital role in providing the most efficient and effective service 
at a minimum cost (Chang et al., 2012), especially when CTOs are likely to provide 
homogenous service and compete based on the cost reduction. In terms of differentiation, CTOs 
tend to provide homogeneous services: the transfer of boxes between ship and ashore (Ashar, 
2001). The fact that services are not differentiated makes cost reduction important to their 
competition. The overcapacity problem often occurs when competitors aim at preemptive 
behaviour in pursuit of a cost advantage and the MES because larger plants are likely to be 
more efficient than smaller plants. The MES of a container terminal is defined as “the smallest 
scale at which output can be produced at minimum average long run cost” (Kaselimi et al., 
2011, p. 72). If the MES of a current CTO is large compared with the market size, potential or 
new entrants may encounter competitive disadvantage owing to a smaller scale or need for 
building a similar capacity to that of the CTO (De Langen and Pallis, 2007). This may lead 
both of them to the possibility of price war and profit loss because of the considerable excess 
supply (De Langen and Pallis, 2007). 
 
2.2. Overcapacity issues: the case of ports in Korea 
Recently, very low container cargo handling fees have been a controversial issue in Korea due 
to overcapacity (Korea Shipping Gazette, 2014). Busan port, the largest container port in Korea 
aims to become a major hub port in North-East Asia by building and developing New port from 
2006 up to now under the base of North port. When allowing new entrants into the port, policy 
should be very careful regarding creating conditions that allow entry without directly hindering 
the survival and growth of incumbents (De Langen and Pallis, 2007). Unfortunately, many 
CTOs in Korea have suffered overcapacity problems derived from the Korean government’s 
expanding plans based on too optimistic forecasts (Korea Shipping Gazette, 2013). This 
decision to expand container ports on a large scale has led to overcapacity. After a number of 
new CTOs entered the port market, they have sought to occupy cargoes. Market entry was too 
rapid and easy due to government support, even though this adding capacity in large lumps 
should be carried out with caution. As a result, they have started to compete with each other 
based on price reduction to capture more cargoes and shipping lines, although when changing 
the port price they should be extremely careful (Gardner et al., 2006). This drastically 
exacerbates the CTO’s margin. According to a game theoretic approach, it is not likely that the 
outcomes of price war lead to a predatory situation if entry barriers are not significant (Flor 
and Defilippi, 2003). Even if the CTO temporarily reduces the price below its cost, it would be 
unable to recover its losses even after eliminating competition, since price increase may foster 
the entry of new players (Flor and Defilippi, 2003). In reality, however, some CTOs in Busan 
port tend to be myopic, so they simply start to reduce the price without allowing for a 
competitor’s response. Since 2011, container cargo throughput has been tied up while the 
supply of terminal facilities has gradually increased. It causes an imbalance between demand 
and supply. In turn, CTOs were about to lower their price at break-even point in 2013 (Korea 
Shipping Gazette, 2014). The main reasons for the overcapacity stemmed from incorrect 
forecast of port demand. Busan New port has been initiated based on this forecast, since 
demand for Busan port is expected to increase in the long-term perspective. However, this 
forecast does not fit real demands for terminal facilities, so overcapacity problems occur. Prior 
to the Busan New port construction, insightfully, a report from OECD (2004) warned that the 
rush towards the costly building of mega container ports may lead to the pitfall of 
overinvestment, and pointed out that such a rush for ever heavier investment is lucrative only 
when economic growth remains strong. 
In 2013, the container handling fee per TEU in Busan port approximately cost $45-50, 
significantly less than in both Shanghai port ($80-90) in China and Tokyo port ($160-180) in 
Japan (Korea Shipping Gazette, 2013). This handling fee in Busan port is equivalent to that of 
1/8 of LA port in USA and 2/3 of Kaohsiung port in Taiwan. Of course, CTOs are interested 
in reducing or stabilising the container handling fee as long as they can maximise the profits 
(Bassan, 2007). High price may simply guide the port to extinction while low prices may attract 
customers but investment costs may not be recovered in the long-run (Haralambides, 2002).  
The aforementioned overcapacity issues in the ports of Korea and the fact that quantitative 
approaches to the determination of MES remain hugely untouched territory, where most port 
economists have approached this issue to a limited extent and mostly in a qualitative manner 
(Theys et al., 2010), stimulate the current study.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Finding MES 
As firms start producing output such as goods, services or throughput in the case of CTOs, they 
will initially face increasing returns to scale (RTS). In other words, they can obtain a 
proportionally larger amount of output than the increase in inputs. Consequently, their average 
costs will decline with more output, which is called economies of scale. However, if the firms 
increase production further until economies of scale are exploited, increasing RTS will 
eventually turn into constant and then decreasing RTS where only proportionally smaller 
output is generated given the same increase in input. Concurrently, average costs will decrease, 
hit a minimum and then start going up. This change corresponds with a U-shaped total average 
cost curve that is commonly used in economics. 
The MES is technically defined as the optimal amount of production that minimises total 
average cost. It can be found at the minimum point of the average cost (AC) function. On the 
other hand, the MES can be also derived using the RTS function. This is because the minimum 
point of the AC function is located where increasing RTS (RTS>1) changes to decreasing RTS 
(RTS<1). That is, the MES occurs where RTS is 1. Zellner and Revankar (1969) first 
introduced the method of finding MES using the RTS function based on the generalised 
production function and then Zellner and Ryu (1998) elaborated the method by additionally 
deriving the AC function from the RTS function. Our study follows their method as explained 
below.  
 
3.2. The production function to the RTS function 
Suppose a generic production function  
 𝑓 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) (1) 
where f is a homogeneous function of degree μ, K and L are factors of production and 
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝐾
> 0 
and  
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝐿
> 0. K and L commonly represent the amount of capital and labour, but any main 
factors of production can be used for this purpose.  
The monotonic transformation of f yields a homothetic production function (y), which is 
defined as a generalised production function (Zellner and Revankar, 1969).  
 𝑦 = 𝑦(𝑓) (2) 
where y=0 if f=0 and  
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑓
> 0. The main property of a homothetic production function is that 
marginal rate of technical substitution between K and L is homogenous of degree zero, i.e. it 
does not depend on the proportional increase of the factors of production.   
Then, the RTS function is defined as Zellner and Ryu (1998). 
 𝛼(𝑦) = 𝛼(𝑑𝑦/𝑦)/(𝑑𝑓/𝑓) (3) 
where α is a scale parameter which is also an initial value of RTS at y=0. 
Its functional form can be specified following Zeller and Ryu (1998). 
 𝛼(𝑦) = 𝛼/(1 + 𝜃𝑦) (4) 
If θ>0, RTS decreases as y goes up, but it increases if θ<0. 
 
3.3. MES and the average cost (AC) function 
Rearrange the RTS function (4) for y, 
 𝑦 = (𝛼 − 𝛼(𝑦))/𝛼(𝑦)𝜃 (5) 
The average cost minimising production level, i.e. the minimum efficient scale (MES), is found 
where RTS is 1. Thus, the value of the MES is: 
 𝑦∗ = (𝛼 − 1)/𝜃 (6) 
On the other hand, the RTS function is alternatively defined as: 
 α(y) = AC(y)/MC(y)  (7) 
where AC(y) is an average cost function and MC(y) is a marginal cost function. Since a total 
cost (TC) function is defined in terms of an average cost function as TC(y) = 𝑦AC(𝑦), solving 
the optimisation problem of the total cost function yields1: 
 ln𝑇𝐶(𝑦) = 𝑐 + ∫ (1/𝛼(𝑦)𝑦)𝑑𝑦 (8) 
where c is the constant of integration.  
                                                 
1 See Zellner and Ryu (1998) for technical details. 
Then, using the specified RTS function in (4) and solving the above equation, the average cost 
(AC) function can be fully derived. 
 ln 𝐴𝐶 = ln (𝑐) + ((1 − 𝛼)ln𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦)/𝛼 (9) 
 
3.4. Estimation method 
Substitute (4) for α(y) in (3) and solve the differential equation.  
 𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 = 𝑙𝑛𝑓 (10) 
Now substitute a Cobb-Douglas production function 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝛾𝐾𝛼(1−𝛿)𝐿𝛼𝛿  for f. 
 𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 = ln𝛾 + 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝛼𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐿 (11) 
where α is a scale parameter as defined above and δ is a weight parameter.  
Assuming an identically and independently distributed error term that follows a normal 
distribution, the log likelihood (LL) function of (11) can be derived.  
 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐′ + (𝑁/2)ln [∑{𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛𝛾 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 𝛼𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐿}2
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
+ ∑ ln (1 + 𝜃𝑦)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(12) 
where N is observation size, i is an observation index and c’ is a constant 
The individual contribution (ll) is: 
 𝑙𝑙 = −(1/2)lnσ2 − (1/2𝜎2){𝑙𝑛𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛𝛾 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑛𝐾 − 𝛼𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐿}2
+ ln (1 + 𝜃𝑦) 
(13) 
 
Then, the numerical optimisation in the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method can 
estimate the unknown parameters, σ, θ, α and δ. We use Marquardt algorithm (Marquardt, 1963) 
for this study. The value of α is obtained by adding two coefficient estimates (α = α(1-δ) + αδ) 
and the value of δ is subsequently obtained by dividing αδ by α. Finally, the AC function and 
the MES value can be obtained as outlined in (6) and (9).  
 
3.5. Data 
The sample used in this study consists of 24 CTOs in ten Korean ports, which covered95.8% 
of total throughput of Korea in 2013. The data are combined from Data Analysis, Retrieval and 
Transfer (DART) System of Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) of the Korean government, 
Korea Port Logistics Association (KPLA), the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KCCI), the website of port authorities, website of each Regional Oceans & Fisheries 
Administration (ROFA), the website of Shipping and Port Integrated Data Centre (SP-IDC) 
and website of each CTO. The list of the CTOs is reported in Table 1.  
  
Table 1 
The list of CTOs. 
 
ID Port Container Terminal Operator TEU Profits 
1 Busan Jaseong Hutchison Korea Terminals 1,366,534 -10,549,262,685 
2  Sinseon CJ Korea Express Busan Container Terminal 1,744,861 -41,678,629,041 
3  Gamman Sebang Busan Container Terminal 1,465,206 -12,731,361,643 
4  Shin Gamman Dongbu Busan Container Terminal 1,032,732 2,632,449,513 
5  New Port 1 Pusan New Port International Terminal 1,747,307 -5,191,638,049 
6  New Port 2 Busan New Port 3,299,457 35,726,290,824 
7  New Port 3 Hanjin New Port 2,375,614 21,945,464,049 
8  New Port 4 Hyundai Busan Newport Terminal 2,391,890 18,176,946,309 
9  New Port 5 BNCT 1,099,366 -79,328,321,784 
10 Gwangyang Port 2-1 Hanjin Shipping Gwangyang Terminal 634,916 -33,000,000 
11  Port 2-2 Korea International Terminal 747,445 325,974,235 
12  Port 3-1 Gwangyang West Containter Terminal 902,077 76,000,000 
13 Incheon ICT Incheon Container Terminal 592,662 7,022,397,041 
14  SICT Sunkwang 237,800 107,000,000 
15  Korea Express CJ Korea Express 400,870 -539,102,405 
16 PyeongTaek East Port Pyeongtaek Container Terminal 285,906 815,152,455 
17  East Port Pyeongtaek Dongbang I-Port 85,772 -12,576,541,611 
18 Ulsan Newport Ulsan Dongbang I-Port 239,018 -9,622,001,489 
19  JCT Jeongil Ulsna Container Terminal 145,538 414,245,562 
20 Mokpo Newport Mokpo Newport 93,920 -3,956,695,064 
21 Pohang Yeongil Newport Pohang Yeongil Newport 114,649 -8,982,167,733 
22 Masan Port 4 Masan Port 4 Operation 6,451 -132,000,000 
23 Daesan Port 1 Daesan Port Operation 63,739 -8,982,167,733 
24 Kyeongin Incheon Terminal Hanjin Shipping 28,000  - 
 
Note: TEU represents annual throughput in 2013. Profits are annual profits in 2013 and denoted in 
Korean Won.  
Source: Compiled by Authors from Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) System of Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS) of the Korean government, Korea Port Logistics Association (KPLA), the 
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), the website of port authorities, website of each 
Regional Oceans & Fisheries Administration (ROFA), the website of Shipping and Port Integrated Data 
Centre (SP-IDC) and website of each CTO. 
 
  
The main business of the CTOs can be considered as generating throughput using their facilities 
and labour force. Therefore, their throughput (TEU) can be defined as production (y), which is 
a function of the amount of non-current or fixed assets (K) and the size of workforce (L) as in 
(11).  
The data of the CTOs are retrieved from the balance sheets and the profit and loss accounts of 
their 2013 annual reports. Initially, we compare two model specifications before presenting the 
final model. The first model (Model 1) uses non-current assets as K, which includes property, 
plant and equipment, intangible assets and other long-term investments. Its sample size is 20. 
Four CTOs (ID 12, 13, 23 and 24) are excluded since the size of the workforce is not reported. 
On the other hand, non-current assets may include assets that are not critical in port operation, 
so we also test an alternative model (Model 2). It uses a narrower term, fixed (or tangible) 
assets, which include only property, plant and equipment. Model 2 uses 17 CTOs that 
additionally excludes CTO ID 10, 14, and 22 as they do not report fixed assets separately in 
their annual reports.  
 
4. Results  
The generalised production function in (11) is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) method as described in the methodology section. The estimation results of 
both models are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Estimation results. 
 
Model 1: Non-current assets and workforce     
Coefficients θ   α(1-δ)   αδ   constant 
Estimates 0.0000  0.1218  1.6200  2.8150 
Standard errors 0.0000  0.0703  0.3437  2.3130 
p-value 0.0987   0.0832   0.0000   0.2236 
α 1.7418   δ   0.9301 n 20 
Log Likelihood -0.0575       SIC   0.7547 
        
Model 2: fixed assets and workforce 
Coefficients θ   α(1-δ)   αδ   constant 
Estimates 0.0000  0.1994  0.9811  3.6440 
Standard errors 0.0000  0.1508  0.2750  4.2387 
p-value 0.6835   0.1861   0.0004   0.3900 
α 1.1805   δ   0.8311 n 17 
Log Likelihood 5.3308       SIC   0.2061 
Note: α(1-δ) is the coefficient of lnK and αδ is the coefficient of lnL. p-value is probability value for 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. n is sample size. SIC is Schwarz Information Criteria 
and AIC is Akaike Information Criteria.  
 
The size of workforce (L) significantly and positively affects the amount of throughput in both 
models as the coefficients, αδ, indicate. That is, the larger workforce leads to more TEU 
processed. It is consistent with what is usually expected from container port operation. The 
weight of workforce (δ) in producing throughput is also large. On the other hand, the 
importance of non-current or fixed assets (K) is relatively weak in both estimation results and 
only significant in Model 1. When two models are compared in terms of their explaining power, 
Model 1 seems to be a stronger model in terms of the significance of individual coefficients 
and the higher values of information criteria, although log likelihood value is larger in Model 
2. This is probably because Model 2 uses smaller sample size and a narrower definition of 
assets.  
Subsequently, the RTS function in (4) and the average cost (AC) function in (9) are retrieved 
using the estimated coefficients, α, δ and θ. The changes of both functions over throughput 
(TEU) are depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Returns to scale function and MES of CTOs in South Korea (Model 1). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Average cost function and MES of CTOs in South Korea (Model 1). 
Note: Each dot represents the returns to scale or the average cost of container terminal operators. The 
constant of integration in (9) is not estimated due to the lack of cost data. Therefore, average costs in y 
axis do not correspond to the container terminal operators’ estimated costs.The value of the MES is 
calculated as 752,913 TEU using (6). In Fig 1, the value of RTS starts from 1.7418 (α at y=0), 
which corresponds to increasing RTS (RTS>1), and declines as throughput (y) increases. RTS 
reaches 1 at the MES and eventually goes below 1, showing decreasing RTS. In Fig. 2, average 
cost function declines quickly to a minimum point, i.e., the MES, and then increases relatively 
slowly afterwards. This curvature of the average cost function is similar to what was anticipated 
roughly in Kaselimi et al. (2011). On the other hand, the graphs of the RTS and the AC 
functions from Model 2 are presented in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. The estimated MES is 716,898TEU.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Returns to scale function and MES of CTOs in South Korea (Model 2). 
 
Fig. 4. Average cost function and MES of CTOs in South Korea (Model 2). 
Note: Each dot represents the returns to scale or the average cost of container terminal operators. The 
constant of integration in (9) is not estimated due to the lack of cost data. Therefore, average costs in y 
axis do not correspond to the container terminal operators’ estimated costs. 
  
The following table summarises whether each individual CTO’s throughput lies in the over, 
under or optimal capacity area. Overcapacity and undercapacity are defined as having 
throughput larger or smaller than the estimated MES, respectively. Optimal capacity is defined 
as having throughput within a specified range e.g. 10 or 20%, around the MES.  
 
Table 3 
Over, under and optimal capacity of CTOs relative to the estimated MES. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
    MES = 752,913 MES = 716,898 
ID TEU O/U 
MES+-
10% 
MES+-
20% 
O/U 
MES+-
10% 
MES+-
20% 
6 3,299,457 O N N O N N 
8 2,391,890 O N N O N N 
7 2,375,614 O N N O N N 
5 1,747,307 O N N O N N 
2 1,744,861 O N N O N N 
3 1,465,206 O N N O N N 
1 1,366,534 O N N O N N 
9 1,099,366 O N N O N N 
4 1,032,732 O N N O N N 
12 902,077 O N Y O N N 
11 747,445 U Y Y O Y Y 
10 634,916 U N Y U N Y 
13 592,662 U N N U N Y 
15 400,870 U N N U N N 
16 285,906 U N N U N N 
18 239,018 U N N U N N 
14 237,800 U N N U N N 
19 145,538 U N N U N N 
21 114,649 U N N U N N 
20 93,920 U N N U N N 
17 85,772 U N N U N N 
23 63,739 U N N U N N 
24 28,000 U N N U N N 
22 6,451 U N N U N N 
    Over:Under = 10:14  Over:Under = 11:13 
Note: ID is the identification number for individual CTOs given in Table 1. ‘U’ and ‘O’ indicate a 
terminal operator’s TEU is smaller or larger than the estimated MES. ‘Y’ indicates an operator’s TEU 
lies within a specified range of the estimated MES as an indication of optimal capacity. ‘N’ is given if 
not. Two ranges, MES±10% and ±20%, are used to find optimality.   
 
The issue of overcapacity looks relatively modest considering 10 out of 24 (Model 1) or 11 out 
of 24 (Model 2) have throughput larger than the MES. Conversely, this also means that 
undercapacity seems a stronger issue in Korean container ports. However, if we focus on the 
Busan port (from ID 1 to 9), overcapacity issues are ubiquitous in both models. In addition, no 
CTOs in Busan port are within the range of optimal capacity around the MES. Only 3 out of 
24 CTO throughputs are within the 20% range of the MES in both Model 1 and 2.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Notwithstanding the importance of MES in any industry, extant literature has failed to estimate 
the MES of the port industry. Although some approaches (see Kaselimi et al. 2011) have been 
undertaken to seek MES, no single study accurately estimated the MES in the port industry. 
By adopting Zellner and Revankar (1969) and Zellner and Ryu (1998), this study suggests and 
applies a new approach to estimate the MES of the port industry with Korean data, which may 
contribute to providing port policy makers and port planners with insights when they consider 
reshaping policies pertaining to port competition, port concession, port planning and 
overcapacity. When they have no confidence in future demands in the near future and need to 
estimate the proper terminal scale, the results of this study by estimating the MES can offer 
valuable information.  
The results from the calculated value of the MES indicate that 14 (Model 1) or 13 (Model 2) 
out of 24 CTOs operate in sub-MES scale i.e. their TEU’s are smaller than the MES (Model 
1). This finding may indicate that an excessive number of CTOs exist in the market, which also 
increases overcapacity and worsens their cost structure as seen in their negative profits in Table 
1. Additionally, Fig. 1 and 2 show that the CTOs’ TEUs are widely spread around the estimated 
MES. That is, their operations are overall far from optimal in terms of the distance of their 
TEUs from the MES. Also, only three CTOs are within the 20 % range of the MES (Table 3). 
Most of them are not likely to efficiently operate the terminal, because average costs are 
relatively high. It implies that CTOs that have small scales undertake the terminal operation 
with high operating costs. However, it can be argued that overall the port capacity in Busan 
port may lean towards overcapacity since all of the CTOs in Busan operate at more than 20% 
of MES. This finding is consistent with major Korean shipping news that in particular Busan 
port has encountered overcapacity (Korea Shipping Gazette, 2014). De Langen and Pallis 
(2006; p. 9) ascertained “an important condition for the viability of intra competition is that the 
market should be at least twice as large as the MES for providing a port service”. In the case 
of Busan port, their market demand of container throughput in 2013 was approximately 
17,686,099TEU 2  (KPLA, 2015), which is approximately 25 (17,686,099/716,898=24.67) 
times that of the MES. This may cause excessive intra competition, since large market size 
relative to the MES leads to intra-port competition. It is found that the number of CTOs in 
Korea is increasing, whereas their profits have been decreasing over recent years, causing 
overcapacity issues. Interestingly, this finding would be similar to Chang et al. (2012)’s 
findings that the Korean government appeared to have over-invested in recent port 
developments.  
A possible explanation for the above results would be that since 1997 the Korean government 
has changed the policy from the license system to the registration one when CTOs enter the 
port market. At the same time, the registration requirement has been significantly alleviated 
(Korea Shipping Gazette, 2014). As a result, many CTOs could easily enter the market. Then, 
                                                 
2 This is slightly different from the sum of TEU in Busan port in Table 1, since some terminals (e.g. Gamcheon 
Hanjin terminal: 264TEU, Uam terminal: 514,920TEU, General terminal: 598,215TEU, multi-purpose terminal: 
49,734TEU) were not included in the analysis due to the lack of data availability (e.g. turnover and profit). 
there has been overcapacity. This devastated the existing and new CTOs’ profits. Notably, this 
phenomenon is contrary to the EU case. As an example, until the mid 1990s, EU was likely to 
be protectionist by awarding new terminals to incumbents when their terminal business was 
not lucrative and financial condition was weak (Rodrigue et al., 2011). Interestingly, De 
Langen and Pallis (2007) found that there is only one CTO in almost half the ports they 
surveyed in the EU. On the other hand, for instance, Busan North port had ten CTOs before the 
construction of new ports, but over five CTOs entered the port market in the period between 
2007 and 2010. It can be argued that the overcapacity issue is not surprising given that there 
are too many CTOs in one port who are attracting the same customers in similar geographical 
ranges. Hutchison Korea Terminals, subsidiary of Hong Kong’s Hutchison Port Holdings 
(HPH) suspended the one berth at Gamman terminal, and declared that they would return the 
berth to the Busan port authority because of overcapacity and financial difficulty, although it 
has obtained a concession period between 2002 and 2027 (Monthly Maritime Korea, 2013). 
This phenomenon typically shows that the HPH, whose port operation expertise is the best in 
the world, also could not manage to deal with overcapacity of Busan port in Korea. As a matter 
of fact, this issue should be carefully handled by government intervention and new port policy, 
since there may be no room for implementing strategic movement under such overcapacity. 
Terada (2002; p. 3) argued that for under/overcapacity issues in ports “government intervention 
is necessary to correct the market failure and attain the socially optimal quantity of the public 
service that the facility generates”. Economic theories claimed that when an incumbent faces 
new entrants in the market, it tends to adopt a pre-emptive pricing strategy or to establish 
excessive capacity so as to defend its market status (Spence, 1977; Eaton and Lipsey, 1977). 
However, if the entrants have competitive advantage such as better location or technology, then 
the above actions do not prevent the growth of the entrants (Luo et al., 2012). Interestingly, 
Busan North ports, which are incumbents, encounter financial difficulty, whilst the profit of 
Busan New port’s CTOs (entrants) seems adequate (see Table 1). The reason for this would be 
that Busan New port has faster container cargo handling equipment, deeper water depth and 
better location to accommodate the mega container ships.  
Before awarding concession, government or port authorities therefore should try to find a 
balance between economies of scale and overcapacity so as to make sure economies of scale 
are passed on to the customers and CTOs earn appropriate profits (Kaselimi et al., 2011). In 
order to exploit the economies of scale, the Korean government may initiate the integration of 
CTOs that have not reached the MES as long as their geographical location is in proximity. 
Central government body (Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries) recognised the need for integration 
of the CTOs, so it has tried to integrate four CTOs into one at Gamman terminal of Busan 
North port. Gamman terminal has four berths. It was operated by four CTOs, each of which 
was in charge of one berth. Further, government policy promotes the integration between 
Sinsundae terminal and Uam terminal of Busan North port. Once, integration is complete, they 
operate the combined berths together. It may be interpreted that this integration is a belated 
effort to mitigate overcapacity on purpose. This promotion of integration was not based on the 
estimation of the MES. If the government conducted the estimation of the MES in regard to 
whether awarding one terminal or splitting it into multiple CTOs before allowing too many 
CTOs to enter this market (Theys et al., 2010), it would avoid the wasteful overcapacity of the 
port industry in Korea. In terms of port policy, it should not be overlooked that the aim of 
government and port authorities is to maximise the annual cargo throughput per area so as to 
shun constructing new terminal capacities until all existing capacities are fully exploited and 
the level of ship waiting time and berth occupancy is intolerable (Bassan, 2007). It would be 
plausible that in order to increase port capacity and avoid additional berth construction port 
planers should concentrate on improving operational productivity by employing re-layouts of 
port facilities and horizontal integration between CTOs (Vis, 2006; Chang et al., 2012). The 
managers of CTOs also should be aware that setting prices below costs to entice cargoes from 
other rivals amidst intense intra and inter competition is not an advisable strategy 
(Haralambides, 2002), because it drives all CTOs towards a zero-sum game.  
Prior to concluding this paper, it should be noted that this paper argues that ports (or CTOs) 
might compete primarily on cost due to the rather substitutable nature of the service when the 
shipping line chooses the CTO. However, numerous previous studies on port competitiveness 
and port selection contended that there are a number of other determinants such as physical 
location, reliability of schedules in port, faster handling operations, inter-modal link, port 
congestion, port safety, skilled port labour etc (Tongzon and Heng, 2005; Yeo et al., 2008; 
Chang et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2014; Yang and Chen, 2016). As Kaselimi et al. (2011) stressed 
that many other factors affect the preferred scaled observed in practice compared to the actual 
MES, it may be plausible to admit that identifying the MES is only part of the story pertaining 
to the optimal level of output. Owing to a difficulty in identifying MES which derived from 
other considerable factors such as different port governance, market size, structure and 
operational considerations (Kaselimi et al., 2011), in practice, it can be argued that many ports 
in the world operate with half that level of output and consider themselves easily large enough 
to be achieving economies of scale.  
Despite this study’s novelty, it has several limitations. The estimation results show that the 
amount of throughput is explained by the size of the workforce well. However, the causation 
may not be uni-directional since the larger throughput could cause more employment. Also, 
different specifications of the RTS functions could be tested in the future research. On the other 
hand, non-current or fixed assets are not strongly significant in producing throughput in the 
results. A couple of reasons could be behind this finding. First, the large amount of non-current 
or fixed assets does not always guarantee the increase in throughput since they are more closely 
related to the capacity not actual processing. Thus, the linkage between non-current or fixed 
assets and throughput seems weaker than normally expected. Second, the accounts of non-
current and fixed assets in annual reports may not fully reflect the essential assets in container 
terminal operation. The use of more relevant datasets is recommended for future research. This 
study has a weakness in terms of generalisation because the data were collected from only 
Korea. Nonetheless, the main application of this research might be applied to other regions 
such as China and South-East Asia where overcapacity is getting fierce. Finally, this study only 
explored the container port industry. Accordingly, future research can investigate the liquid 
and dry bulk port sector.  
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